Topics: Econ 521, Spring 2007

SECTION ONE: DERIVED DEMAND FOR FACTORS

I. Production theory: Primal

A. Single input

·        Output elasticity

·        Scale elasticity

·        Stages of production and optimal demand

·        Short-run derived demand for labor

·        Cobb-Douglas as a first-order approximation to an unknown production function

·        Relationship between marginal and average products

·        Graphical representations of demand

·        Wages, Labor Productivity and Unit Labor Cost

·        Unit Labor Cost and trade flows

B. Multiple inputs

·        Convex Isoquants and firm optima

·        Concave production and the bordered Hessian

·        Elasticity of substitution

·        Output constant input demand

C. Empirical Strategies for primal estimation

·        Translog as a second order approximation to an unknown production function

·        Application: Efficiency wage models: Solow and Shapiro-Stiglitz

·              Huang et al

·        Ackerloff-Yellen

·              Hibbs-Locking

·        Matched firm worker data

·              Hellerstein et al on wages and marginal products

·              Moretti on human capital externalities

D. Fundamental Law of Factor Demand

·        Derivation

·        Scale and Substitution elasticities

·        Hicks-Marshall Laws of Derived Demand

E. Digression on O-ring Production

·        Role of complementary skills on

o       Matching across worker skills

o       Firm size

o       Returns to skill

o       Organization of production by stages

II. Production Theory: Dual

A. Cost function

·        Derivation of input demands

·        Derived relationship between dual and primal

·        Translog cost function as a second order approximation to an unknown cost function

·        Output constant demand

·        Elasticities of substitution

B. Empirical Strategies for dual estimation

  • Adams on the impact of R&D investment on demand for low and high skill workers
  • Ollinger et al on returns to scale and technology adoption

III. CES methods

  • General application to two input problems
  •             Relative wages as a function of relative input quantities
  •             Example: returns to skill, technology change and the baby boom
  • Card and Lemieux: allowing more elasticities of substitution
  • Hanson on illegal immigration and extension to three inputs

IV. Rules of thumb for designing studies

  • Defining the unit of observation
  • Time series vs cross section data
  • Single vs multiple equation methods
  • Level of aggregation
  • Elasticity of complementarity and inverse demands
  • Primal is for exogenous inputs, dual is for exogenous prices
  • Instrumental variables
  • Measurement errors

V.  Nonlinear isocost lines: choosing hours versus numbers of workers

  • Policy applications
  • Labor marker regulations and relative unemployment in OECD countries
  • Trejo on overtime premiums
  • Autor on exceptions to the “employment at will doctrine” and temporary employment

SECTION TWO: EARNINGS INEQUALITY

I. Measures

  • Gini coefficients
  • Standard deviations or coefficient of variation
  • 90-10 wage ratios
  • earnings function residual variances

II. Stylized facts for North America and Europe

  • Inequality has been increasing steadily in the U.S. since the 1980s
  • Women are gaining relative to men
  • Minorities gained relative to whites before the 1980s, but relative earnings for minorities stabilized thereafter
  • There have been coincident increases in returns to schooling over that period
  • There have been rising returns to experience over that time frame
  • Wage inequality between women increased, as did wage inequality between men
  • Inequality for men started rising in the 1970s, for women in the 1980s
  • Residual inequality began to increase for both men and women in the 1970s
  • Marriage makes inequality worse if there is a positive correlation between earnings of spouses
  • Recessions raise inequality, at least for men
  • Young college graduates have gained the most, especially in the 1990s
  • There are similar patterns in many industrialized nations, especially those that do not have high minimum wages, strict employment protection, or strong union concentration.

III.  Explanations

  • Katz and Murphy (1987), Murnane-Levy (1992) Econ 1 test
  •             Demand side-factors must have a role except in the 1970s
  •             Use of concavity to test for inverse relationship between relative supply and relative wages
  • Shift-share analysis
  • Residual inequality
  • Earnings variance decomposition
  • Dunne et al (2004): Inequality due to variance in IT investment, skill-biased technical change
  • Beaudry and Green (2005): Inequality due to increase in capital deepening

IV. Discrimination

  • Male-Female wage gap
  • Age vs. Cohort  Effects
  • Earnings decomposition into explained and unexplained gaps
  • Role of residual inequality (swimming upstream)
  • Gaps on exogenous vs endogenous factors
  • Multiple Markets and inappropriate measures of market discrimination
  • Sorting on qualifications: Affirmative Action

 

NONRANDOM SORTING

I.  Sorting and Comparative advantage

  • Plywood vs Hardwood example
  • Piece rates and sorting on quality
  • Sorting on effort
  • Optimal piece rate
  • When to offer or accept piece rates vs salries
  • Lazear and Safelite: Sorting vs Incentives
  • Roy Model
  • Implications of hierarchical sorting on earnings distributions

II. Enrepreneurship

  • Lazear: the role of narrow versus braod skills
  • Hamilton: sorting versus human capital versus compensating differentials

III.  Statistical Tools for Nonrandom Sorting

  • Heckman Selection Corrections
  • Missing Variables
  • Implications of adding endogenous regressors
  • Control function estimators
  •             Selection on observables
  •             Selection on unobservables
  • Twins
  • Instrumental Variables
  • Wald Estimator
  • Regression Discontinuity
  • Fixed Effect Estimators
  • Difference-In-Differences
  • Propensity score matching

III.  Experimental; Designs

  • Reflexive designs
  • Ex post matched comparisons
  • Ex ante matched comparisons
  • Difference-in-Differences
  • Covariate controls
  • Potential Problems
  •             Ongoing Programs vs pilots
  •             Randomization bias
  •             Substitution bias
  •             Dropout bias
  •             Limited duration pilots vs long-term impacts
  •             Hawthorne effects
  • JTPA and other training programs
  •             Experimental vs nonexperimental estimates
  •             Heckman and Smith (2004): Nonrandom selection into experiments

IV.  Compensation Issues

·        Lazear Models

·                    Tournaments

·                    Hawks and Doves

·                    Stock Options

·                    Executive compensation and the principle-agent problem

·                    Empirical evidence on tournaments, Bognano (2001) and Audas et al (2004)

·                    Empirical evidence on CEO compensation, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001, 2003)