Technology, trade and factor prices

Paul R. Krugman*

Department of Economics, E52-383a, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA

Received 1 June 1998; accepted 3 March 1999

Abstract

The view that recent changes in the distribution of income primarily reflect technology rather than trade may be the majority opinion, but has been harshly criticized by some trade economists. This paper will argue that the critique in fact misses the point, essentially because the critics undertake the wrong thought experiments. Trade volumes are not irrelevant: if one poses the question correctly, one immediately realizes that small trade volumes are inconsistent with a story that attributes large distributional effects to trade. The factor bias of technological change is not immaterial, except in the case where such change takes place in a small open economy (as opposed to one that can affect world prices), and where technical change occurs only in that economy (rather than occurring simultaneously in other economies as well); since the real situation does not meet either criterion, factor bias definitely does matter. Most surprisingly, the much maligned use of a factor content approach to infer the effects of trade on factor prices turns out to be an entirely justified procedure when carefully applied. © 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Factor prices; Technology; Trade

JEL classification: F11; F16

1. Introduction

Over the last decade or so, the Stolper–Samuelson theorem, that classic piece of trade theory which asserts that changes in goods prices have magnified effects on
factor prices, has moved from midterm exams into the heart of real-world debates over economic policy. The reason is that an expansion of world trade, and especially of manufactures' exports from low-wage countries, has coincided with a fall in the real wages of less-skilled American workers (and with rising unemployment in other advanced countries). It is natural to suspect a link between trade and declining wages; indeed, many commentators, including some economists, have not hesitated to assert flatly that growing trade is the principal cause of wage decline.

It is probably fair to say, however, that the majority view among serious economic analysts is that international trade has had only a limited impact on wages. Skepticism about the effects of trade on wages rests essentially on the observation that despite its growth, trade is still quite small compared with the economies of advanced nations. In particular, imports of manufactured goods from developing countries are still only about 2 percent of the combined GDP of the OECD. The conventional wisdom is that trade flows of this limited magnitude cannot explain the very large changes in relative factor prices that have occurred, in particular the roughly 30 percent rise in the wage premium associated with a college education that has taken place in the United States since the 1970s. Low estimates of the impact of trade on wages are often, though not always, based on a methodology that tries to compute the “factor content” of trade, and divides the trade-induced changes in relative “effective” factor supplies by some estimated or assumed elasticity of substitution.

If trade does not explain the bulk of the change in factor prices, what does? The conventional answer is that technology is the culprit; in particular, that there has been a pervasive skill-using bias in recent technological change, which has shifted demand toward skilled and away from unskilled labor.

But while the view that recent changes in the distribution of income primarily reflect technology rather than trade may be the majority opinion, it has been harshly criticized by some trade economists, especially by Leamer (1998, 2000). The critique by Leamer and others may be summarized as follows:

1. The observation that the volume of trade between low-wage and high-wage countries is small is irrelevant: prices rather than quantities are what matter, and prices are determined on the margin.
2. The attempt to estimate the impact of trade by looking at its factor content is a nonsensical exercise, betraying a failure to understand basic trade theory.
3. The factor bias of technological change is also irrelevant: trade theory tells us that what matters is the sector in which technical progress occurs, not the factor bias of that change.

This critique would be very serious, if correct. However, this paper will argue that the critique in fact misses the point, essentially because the critics undertake the wrong thought experiments. Trade volumes are not irrelevant: if one poses the
question correctly, one immediately realizes that small trade volumes are inconsistent with a story that attributes large distributional effects to trade. The factor bias of technological change is not immaterial, except in the case where such change takes place in a small open economy (as opposed to one that can affect world prices), and where technical change occurs only in that economy (rather than occurring simultaneously in other economies as well); since the real situation does not meet either criterion, factor bias definitely does matter. Most surprisingly, the much maligned use of a factor content approach to infer the effects of trade on factor prices turns out to be an entirely justified procedure when carefully applied.

This paper is in six parts. It begins with the impact of technology on factor prices. Section 2 reviews the standard analysis of technology and factor prices in a one-good economy, while Section 3 turns to a multiple-good economy, discussing the relative roles of sector and factor bias of technological change. Section 4 offers a discussion of the relevance of trade volumes to the assessment of trade's impact on factor prices. Section 5 develops a geometric approach to the relationship between factor prices and factor supplies. Section 6 then uses this machinery to show the validity of the factor content approach when making “but-for” analyses of the effects of trade on income distribution. Finally, Section 7 reviews the debate and asks how it can have gotten so far off track.

2. Technology and factor prices in a one-good economy

A useful starting point for any discussion of the impact of technology on factor prices is the analysis first introduced by Hicks, which showed how the effects of technical progress in a one-good economy depend on its factor bias.

Consider a constant returns, competitive economy that produces a single aggregate output using two inputs, skilled labor ($S$) and unskilled labor ($U$).\(^1\) In Fig. 1 curve II is the initial unit isoquant. The slope of the ray OE is the aggregate ratio of unskilled to skilled labor in the economy, and the slope of $ww$ is the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages.

Now consider the effects of technical progress, which can be represented as an inward shift of II, say to $I'1$. If the relative supplies of skilled and unskilled labor remain unchanged, the new relative wage rate will be determined by the slope of $I'1$ where it crosses OE.

Clearly, the effect of technological change on factor prices depends on the bias of that change. If technical progress is Hicks-neutral, that is if the unit isoquant

\[^1\text{Throughout this paper I will think in terms of a two-factor economy in which the two factors are skilled and unskilled labor. Why not capital and labor? Because the empirical fact is that while the skill premium has risen sharply, the share of compensation in national income has been quite stable. Ideally we would work with three or more factors, but to do so would obscure the important issues treated later in the paper.}\]
simply shifts radially inward, there will be no change in relative factor prices. If technical progress is skill-biased, that is if the ratio of skilled to unskilled employment will rise at any given wage ratio, then the effect of this technical progress will, as shown in Fig. 1, be to raise the skill premium to a level indicated by the slope of $w'w''$.

Notice that it is quite possible that technical progress will actually lower the real wages of some workers. The intercept of $w'w''$ with the vertical axis measures the amount of unskilled labor necessary to purchase one unit of output, i.e. the inverse of the real wage of unskilled labor. As drawn in Fig. 1, this real wage has clearly declined.

This is all standard theory, more than 60 years old. What makes it relevant is that there is overwhelming evidence that recent technological change has indeed been strongly skill-biased. The essential point was made clearly by Lawrence and Slaughter (1993): although the wage premium associated with education has risen sharply since the 1970s, which should other things equal have led to a substitution away from skilled labor, in fact there has been a rise in the college-educated share of employment, not only in the economy as a whole, but within almost every industry.

Does skill-biased technological change, then, explain the rise in the relative wage of skilled workers? I will turn to critiques of this idea in the next section, and to the claim that trade rather than technology is the culprit later in the paper. Before getting to these questions, however, it may be worth mentioning one potentially worrisome issue that arises even if one is willing, for the sake of
argument, to think of the economy as if it produced only one good. The issue is the following: has the growth in total factor productivity been sufficient to be consistent with the large changes we have actually seen in factor prices?²

To see why this might be a problem, consider Fig. 2. Here, I represents an estimate of the unit isoquant at some initial date, say 1973, and E shows the unit inputs of skilled and unskilled labor at that date. At some later date, say 1989, we observe the unit inputs described by $E'$, and the factor prices indicated by $w'w'$. The situation shown here is one in which the growth in average labor productivity has not been very large, indeed in which the input of skilled labor per unit of output has actually increased; but factor prices have changed substantially. Is this outcome consistent with a technological explanation?

The answer is no. One thing we know about technical progress is that old technologies remain available; geometrically, that means that the new unit isoquant cannot lie outside the old one at any point, and therefore also that any factor price line tangent to that new unit isoquant cannot cross the old isoquant. This criterion is clearly violated in Fig. 2. In fact, in this case output would literally be cheaper to produce at 1989 factor prices using the 1973 input coefficients. If the real data looked like this, we would therefore be entitled to

---

²This concern was suggested to me by Kenneth Arrow. It should not be confused with the argument sometimes made that technological change cannot explain wage changes because the rate of growth of total factor productivity has not accelerated. This argument involves a crude confusion between the rate of TFP growth and the bias of that growth.
conclude that technology is not a sufficient explanation for the change in factor prices. (Even if it is not literally cheaper to produce using the old input coefficients, we would still reject the technological explanation if the new factor price line crossed an estimate of the old unit isoquant based on a reasonable elasticity of substitution.)

We see, then, that a technological explanation of changes in factor prices is not a tautology: even before we get to issues posed by international trade, we must face the possibility that a technology explanation will be internally inconsistent. This is most likely to happen if there are large factor price changes over a period of small improvements in productivity, which sounds qualitatively like a good description of the last 20 years in the United States. Before we proceed, then, we had better make sure that the data do not reject a technological explanation out of hand.

Fig. 3 shows some relevant data for the United States, based on wage data from Bernstein and Mishel (1994) and on productivity data from the Economic Report of the President. Skilled workers are identified with college-educated workers; unskilled workers with all others. The 1973 isoquant is an estimate of the unit isoquant based on an elasticity of substitution of 1. It turns out that the technological explanation passes this test: although US productivity growth has been disappointing, it has been large enough that even with a reasonably large elasticity of substitution the data are consistent with a factor-bias explanation of changing factor prices. While this by no means demonstrates that a technology story is correct, it does show that it is feasible.

But there are some trade economists who assert that the whole issue of factor bias in technology is irrelevant, that while factor bias may matter in a one-sector

![Fig. 3. A feasibility test of the technology story.](attachment:image_url)
model, when we consider trading economies with multiple sectors it ceases to have any impact on factor prices. To assess this claim, we must now extend the model.

3. Technology and factor prices in multi-good models

To understand the objections of Leamer and others to analyses that stress the factor bias of technological change, let us now consider an economy that uses skilled and unskilled labor to produce two goods, a skill-intensive good X and an (unskilled) labor-intensive good Y. Let us initially assume that relative goods prices may be taken as given. We will see shortly that this is a very misleading assumption, but it is important to understand the logic.

Fig. 4 uses a Lerner diagram to represent the equilibrium of this economy. The two curves XX and YY are not unit isoquants: they are “equal value” isoquants, each corresponding to the same value at world prices as the other. (Thus each might represent $1 million worth of its respective good.)

If the country is to produce both goods, factor prices must be such that $1 million of X and $1 million of Y cost the same amount to produce. Thus the relative wage must equal the slope of the line $w_w$ that is tangent to both isoquants. And we can then check to confirm that the country will actually produce both goods: it will do so if and only if its endowment lies within the “cone of diversification” defined by the broken lines in the figure.

Now consider the effects of technological progress. Suppose that there is an
improvement in the total factor productivity of the X sector, but that there is no change in the relative price of X, which turns out to be the key assumption. Then the relevant isoquant will shift in, say to X'X', and the relative wage of skilled labor will rise.

What is immediately apparent is that any improvement in the technology for producing X will raise the relative wage of skilled labor, regardless of the factor bias of that change. And similarly any technological advance in Y will shift factor prices the other way. The model thus seems to imply that the emphasis on factor bias suggested by the one-good model is all wrong when we are considering multi-good, trading economies: it is the sector of change, not the factor bias, which matters. And this is precisely the conclusion that Leamer draws.

But is this really right? Does adding a sector and the possibility of international trade really make such a dramatic difference? No, not if we think carefully about what thought experiment we ought to be performing.

Notice that the exercise shown in Fig. 4 is actually a rather peculiar one. It envisages technological progress that occurs in an economy that faces fixed goods prices. To make sense of this scenario, we must suppose not only that this is an open economy that is sufficiently small that it cannot affect its terms of trade, but also that the technological advance is unilateral, that the same technological change is not also happening elsewhere. Examining this scenario is a useful and indeed canonical classroom exercise, but it is not at all what people who attribute recent changes in factor prices to technology have in mind. Rather, what they have in mind is a change in technology that is occurring simultaneously in the United States, Western Europe, and perhaps elsewhere, that is in economies that are individually far from being price-takers on world markets, and that collectively may even be thought of as constituting an “almost closed” economy.

Is this a minor correction, or might it make a big difference to our results? Well, consider for a moment the impact, not of technological change, but of factor supplies on factor prices. It is a familiar point that as long as a small open economy’s endowment remains within the “cone of diversification”, changes in factor supplies have no effect on factor prices: the economy is able to accommodate the changes in factor supplies via a reshuffling of production, so that the demand for factors is in effect infinitely elastic. But few economists would claim that factor prices in the United States, let alone the OECD as a whole, are really unaffected by factor supplies. That is, we all believe that because goods prices are endogenous, an increase in the supply of skilled labor will reduce its wage rate; and we would all regard as unsatisfactory any model in which this was not the case.

But the irrelevance of factor supplies and the irrelevance of the factor bias of technical change in a small open economy are simply two sides of the same coin. That is, neither changes in factor supplies nor the changes in factor demands that result from biased technical change can affect factor prices in a model in which the elasticity of factor demand is infinite. And conversely, if you find the implications
of such a model for the effects of factor supplies on factor prices unacceptable, you must also reject the implications of that model for the effects of the factor bias of technological change.  

Suppose that we believe that the right thought experiment is not to consider a unilateral technological change in a small economy, but rather a simultaneous technological change in the world as a whole, that is in effect technological change in a closed economy. How does this affect our conclusions about which aspects of technological change matter for factor prices?

It is useful to consider a particular example which makes clearly the point that endogenizing prices can thoroughly alter the results of small-economy models. Consider, then, a model of a two-sector closed economy with two special features. First, demand is Cobb–Douglas: a constant share \( \alpha \) of income is spent on the skill-intensive good X. Second, there are fixed proportions in each sector.

The assumption of fixed proportions means that we can determine the allocation of resources between X and Y without reference to factor or goods prices. The allocation of resources is illustrated in Fig. 5. Resources devoted to X are measured from the origin \( O_X \), resources devoted to Y from the origin \( O_Y \). The factor ratios in X and in Y production are shown by the slopes of \( O_X X \) and \( O_Y Y \).

---

\[3\] Leamer (1998) appears to disagree with this point. He asserts as a basic principle that the effect of technological change on factor prices depends on the sector, not the factor bias, of that change, but concedes that it is a defect of his model that factor supplies have no effect on factor prices.
respectively; and the economy’s allocation of resources is therefore shown by the point Q.

Given this allocation, we can then determine factor prices. Let $w$ be the wage of skilled relative to unskilled labor; let $S$ and $U$ be the economy’s supplies of the two factors; and let $S_X, U_X$ be the skilled and unskilled labor employed in the X sector. Since all income is factor

$$wS_X + U_X = \alpha(wS + U)$$

income, and since a share $\alpha$ of that income is spent on X, we have

$$w = \frac{\alpha U - U_X}{S_X - \alpha S}.$$  

Now consider the effects of technical change. First, consider the effect of Hicks-neutral technical change in either sector, that is technical change that does not affect the factor ratio in the progressing sector. It is immediately clear from Fig. 5 that such change has no effect on the allocation of resources, and it is therefore clear from (2) that it has no effect on factor prices. In other words, the conclusion from the small-economy model that Hicks-neutral technical progress in the skill-intensive sector necessarily raises the return to skill turns out to be untrue.

On the other hand, consider the effect of a factor-biased technical change. In Fig. 5 I show the effects of skill-biased progress in the labor-intensive sector Y. (Recall that in the small-economy model technical progress in Y must lower $w$, regardless of its factor bias.) The $S/U$ ratio shifts upward to the slope of $O_Y Y'$. The allocation of resources shifts from Q to $Q'$: both $S_X$ and $U_X$ decline. Referring back to (2), we see that this implies that $w$ rises. It is easy to show that the same is true if skill-biased change occurs in the X sector. That is, skill-biased technical change in either sector raises the return to skill.

In sum, in this example the dictum that it is the sector, not the factor bias, of technical change that matters is precisely wrong. Neutral technological change in either sector has no effect on relative factor prices; biased technological change in either sector raises the price of the factor toward which it is biased. Or to put it differently: in this case a two-sector model behaves just like the one-sector model described in the previous section.

This example relied for clarity on the special assumptions of Cobb–Douglas demand and fixed proportions. Are these assumptions crucial to the results?

Consider first relaxing the fixed-proportions assumption. It is straightforward to confirm that the proposition that Hicks-neutral technical progress does not affect $w$ remains true. After all, (2) continues to hold; so if technological change does not alter the allocation of resources, $w$ will not change. But if technological change has no factor bias, and $w$ does not change, then the allocation of resources will not change either! It is also possible to show that even with flexible factor proportions skill-biased technological change will raise $w$. So the fixed-proportions assumption is not crucial.
What about relaxing the assumption of Cobb–Douglas demand? Suppose that we continue to assume homothetic preferences, but now allow the elasticity of substitution to differ from 1. Then the share of expenditure falling on X, \( \alpha \), now becomes a function of the relative price of X, \( \alpha(p) \). This function will be decreasing or increasing in \( p \) depending on whether the elasticity of substitution is greater or less than one.

Now suppose that we consider Hicks-neutral technological progress in the X sector. This will lead to a fall in \( p \).\(^4\) By inspection of (2), we then see that if the elasticity of substitution in demand is greater than one, technical progress in X will indeed raise the skill premium. (The small open economy case may be thought of as the extreme version in which the elasticity of substitution becomes infinite.) But if the elasticity of substitution is less than one, even Hicks-neutral technical progress in the skill-intensive sector will actually reduce the skill premium.

Is this an extreme or perverse possibility? Not necessarily. These are highly aggregated sectors of the economy, and it is quite possible that the elasticities of substitution in consumption among broad expenditure classes are less than one. (For example, the secular downward trend in the manufacturing share of employment and value-added is commonly attributed to the fact that manufacturing productivity has risen faster than service productivity; this amounts to an assertion that the elasticity of substitution between manufacturing and services is considerably less than one.)

Those trade economists who have asserted that factor price trends depend only on the sector of technical change, and not at all on the factor bias of that change, have therefore got it almost exactly the wrong way around. When technological change occurs in a large economy, or occurs simultaneously in a number of economies which are collectively able to affect world prices, skill-biased progress does indeed tend to raise the skill premium. Meanwhile, the sectoral bias of technical change has an effect which is ambiguous if it is there at all.

In particular, an exercise which attempts to estimate the effects of technological change on factor prices based on the assumption of given goods prices is doubly misleading. It neglects the effects of factor bias, which might well be the main story; and even if technological change had been purely Hicks-neutral (which we know it has not), these estimates could easily get not only the magnitude but even the sign of the effects of that change on factor prices wrong. Such estimates tell us nothing at all about the actual role of technological change in growing wage inequality.

The reason that Leamer attempted a direct estimate of the effects of technological change on factor prices was, of course, his rejection of previous attempts to estimate the technological effect indirectly, by first estimating the effect of international trade on factor prices, a procedure that typically finds only small

\(^4\)Of course, we should think of \( p \) and \( w \) as being simultaneously determined. It is straightforward but tedious to work this out; the results are unchanged.
effects of trade, and thus ends up assigning most of the weight to technology as a residual. At least some other well-respected trade economists have shared the view that conventional estimates of the impact of trade on wages, estimates that depend crucially on calculations involving the volume of trade, are conceptually flawed. But are they? In the remainder of this paper I turn to the question of what, if anything, we can learn from calculations that depend on the volume and/or factor content of trade.

4. Goods prices, factor prices, and the volume of trade

This paper is intended as a discussion of methodology, and will not attempt a fresh empirical analysis of trade and wages. Nonetheless, it is important at this point to indicate the orders of magnitude of the changes that have occurred, since these are central to the argument.

Since 1970 there has been a dramatic widening of wage differentials in the United States. For example, real wages of workers at the 90th percentile have risen about 15 percent, while those of workers at the 10th percentile have fallen about 25 percent. The widening of wage differentials has been less dramatic in other advanced countries, but there has been a secular rise in unemployment in Europe that is widely regarded as the result of an attempt to suppress pressures for growing inequality.

Over the same period international trade, especially the exports of manufactures from low-wage countries, has increased substantially. In particular, OECD imports of manufactures from newly industrializing economies were negligible in 1970, but are about 2 percent of the combined GDPs of the OECD countries today.

Does the growth of North–South trade explain the rise in wage inequality in the advanced countries? The theoretical possibility that it might is obvious: if imports of labor-intensive products have led to a fall in the relative price of these goods in advanced economies, this would imply a Stolper–Samuelson effect that should indeed lower the real wages of less-skilled workers. Most empirical workers have concluded, however, that trade explains at most a fairly small fraction of the rise in inequality; the main reason they reach this conclusion is that although imports of labor-intensive manufactures have grown rapidly, they believe that these imports are still too small as a share of OECD income to explain the massive increase in wage differentials.5

A number of trade economists have, however, rejected the logic on which this assessment is based. They point out that the Stolper–Samuelson theorem demonstrates a relationship between prices of goods and prices of factors, that the volume

---

5Studies that have reached this conclusion include Borjas et al. (1992), Bound and Johnson (1992), Krugman (1995), Lawrence (1995), and Lawrence and Slaughter (1993).
of trade does not enter into the theorem’s statement. As long as a country faces prices that are determined on world markets, they argue, changes in these world market prices will drive changes in domestic factor prices, regardless of the share of trade in GDP. And thus the fact that North–South trade is still not very large is “immaterial” for the question of how much of the growth in wage differentials is explained by trade.

This argument sounds compelling. But before we accept the proposition that “economic theory tells us that trade volumes don’t matter”, we need to think carefully about what question we are trying to answer.

What does it mean to say that North–South trade did or did not “cause” the rise in wage inequality? Deardorff and Hakura (1994) have usefully introduced a bit of legal jargon, pointing out that what we are really asking is a “but-for” question: “What would wages be, but for the availability of manufactures imports from low-wage countries?”

More specifically, we may phrase the question in terms of a counterfactual. In 1970, the OECD imported essentially no manufactured goods from developing economies. It is possible to imagine an alternative history in which the OECD countries have acquired the technology and resources of the mid-1990s, but in which trade with the newly industrializing economies remains negligible (either because these countries did not develop, or because protectionist barriers have blocked off the potential trade). How different would wages be in this alternative world? This, surely, is the question we are asking when we ask how much of the decline in low-skill wages was “caused” by trade.

Notice that we can immediately see that looking at the actual movements in goods prices, and the implications of these movements for factor prices, cannot answer this question. The reason is that actual movements in goods prices may reflect developments in the advanced countries that would have happened even in the absence of North–South trade. Changes in advanced-country factor supplies and technology, the latter operating both directly and via induced changes in factor prices, might well exaggerate, obscure, or reverse the changes in goods prices due to the opening of trade. It might be the case, for example, that technical progress is more rapid in skill-intensive than in labor-intensive sectors, leading to a fall in the relative price of skill-intensive goods even though trade leaves that relative price higher than it would otherwise have been. Or, conversely, a rise in the relative price of skill-intensive goods might reflect skill-biased technical change which raises the skill premium, rather than the opening of trade with labor-abundant countries.

In other words, the economist trying to analyze the effects of trade on wages is not faced with the textbook problem of predicting the effect of a given change in goods prices on factor prices. Instead, the problem is how to infer the impact of trade, as opposed to other influences, on goods prices, only then can one calculate the implied factor price effect. And once one realizes that the issue is one of inference rather than a question about the mechanics of the model, one also
realizes that the volume of trade is not irrelevant or immaterial; it is a crucial piece of evidence.

Experience with trying to explain this point reveals that it is surprisingly difficult to get across, so it may be useful to offer an analogy. (I do not claim that the story is true, though it might be.) Suppose that it turns out that over the past decade Japan has become a significant consumer of coffee, due to changing tastes; and that Japanese imports now amount to 2 percent of the world’s coffee production. And suppose that it is also the case that world coffee prices have doubled in real terms over the same period. What would I say to someone who asserted that Japan’s coffee imports have caused that rise in world prices?

The answer is surely that I can reject his claim, and assert that only a small fraction of the price rise is due to Japanese imports; other factors, like bad weather and pests, must be the main explanation. The argument runs as follows: if Japan had not developed a taste for coffee, the rest of the world would no longer be able to have an excess supply of coffee corresponding to Japan’s imports; the world price of coffee would therefore have to be sufficiently lower to eliminate that excess supply. But because Japanese imports are still a fairly small share of world output, given reasonable elasticities of supply and demand it would not require a very large fall in prices to eliminate that excess supply, surely not a 50 percent fall in prices. Indeed, the most natural way to estimate the role of Japanese imports in the change in world prices would be to do precisely the implied exercise: to use estimates of the supply and demand elasticities to calculate the fall in the price that would be necessary to eliminate the rest-of-world excess supply that offsets Japan’s excess demand.

Suppose that someone were to object that this is bad economics: the volume of Japanese imports is irrelevant, because coffee prices are determined on the margin. The answer would be that he has misunderstood the nature of the exercise: we are not making an assertion about how markets work, we are trying to use market data to infer the answer to a “but-for” question. And for this exercise volume data are not only relevant, they are crucial.

This is a hypothetical, partial-equilibrium example, but the same principles apply to the real general-equilibrium issue of the effects of trade on factor prices. Fig. 6 illustrates the argument. We envision a simplified world in which an aggregate OECD trades with an aggregate consisting of all newly industrializing countries, exporting skill-intensive X and importing labor-intensive Y. Actual OECD production and consumption are indicated by Q and C, respectively; the curve passing through Q and C represents the NIE offer curve. When we ask “What effect has trade had on prices?”, we are in effect asking the question, “What would OECD relative prices be but for the possibility of trading with the NIEs?” That is, we are asking how much higher the relative price of labor-intensive products would be at the autarky point A.

This question may, at least in principle, be answered by calibrating a computable general equilibrium model of the OECD to the actual data, including
the volume of trade, and calculating the difference between the actual relative price and the relative price consistent with autarky. One can then also calculate the implied difference between actual and autarky factor prices; it is this difference which may be regarded as the effect of trade on factor prices. (Notice that for this exercise it is not necessary to model the internal workings of the newly industrializing economies, or even the elasticity of their offer curve; in particular, data about their labor force and capital stock do not play any role in the calculation.)

A quick-and-dirty version of this exercise was carried out in Krugman (1995). I found that North–South trade has lowered the relative price of labor-intensive products by less than 1 percent, and the relative wage of unskilled workers by less than 3 percent. That is, trade has caused a significant but fairly small fraction of the massive increase in wage inequality in advanced countries. One would not want to take this precise number seriously. We may, however, make one fairly robust assertion: in any model with plausible factor shares and elasticities of substitution the offer curve of the OECD will be fairly flat. Given the small actual volume of trade with newly industrializing countries, this means that the difference between actual and estimated autarky prices will not be very large, and therefore that the estimated effect of trade on factor prices will not be very large either.

I would argue that this is basically the right way to think about the issue of trade and factor prices. At the very least, this approach lays down a challenge to economists who claim that trade has had very large effects on wages: can they produce a general equilibrium model of the OECD, with plausible factor shares
and elasticities of substitution, that is consistent both with their assertions and with the limited actual volume of trade? If they cannot, they have not made their case.

But many economists studying the impact of trade on wages have been reluctant to commit themselves to a specific CGE model. Instead, they have tried to use a shortcut, by estimating the "factor content" of trade. That is, they add up an estimate of the factors of production used to produce exports, subtract an estimate of the inputs that would have been used to produce imports, and consider the difference to represent changes in "effective" factor supplies. These changes in effective supplies are then treated as if they were changes in actual resources: the percentage change in the ratio of the "effective" supplies of skilled to unskilled labor is divided by an estimate of the elasticity of substitution to estimate the impact of trade on relative wages.

This shortcut has been almost universally rejected by trade theorists, myself included, as an invalid procedure. But have we been right to reject the factor content approach so summarily? It turns out that we have not: the "but-for" approach to the impact of trade and wages also implies that it is appropriate to think of trade as an implicit kind of factor mobility, with the effect of trade on factor prices determined by the net trade in embodied factor services.

To see this it is helpful to begin with a thought experiment on the effect of factor supplies on factor prices.

5. Doing the two-step: factor supplies and factor prices

For the next thought experiment, we consider not a trading economy but a closed one, and ask how changes in factor supplies change factor prices.

In Fig. 7 the transformation curve TT represents the initial production possibilities of the economy; its consumption and production are at point C.

We now imagine altering the factor endowment by adding skilled labor and subtracting unskilled labor. Let us suppose in particular that the changes in factor supplies are such that the total income of the economy measured at initial factor prices remains unchanged, i.e. that the market value of the unskilled labor subtracted equals the market value of the skilled labor added. This also implies that the total income of the economy will remain unchanged if goods prices remain the same. So the new production possibilities must look like T'T', just tangent to the old budget line at a point like Q.

The initial goods and factor prices are, however, no longer consistent with equilibrium. At the original prices the economy would produce at Q, but it would still consume at C: there would be an excess supply of X and an excess demand for Y. To clear markets, the relative price of X would have to fall, leading to a new equilibrium at a point such as A. And of course factor prices would also change accordingly.

There is no necessary reason why we must think of the effects of a change in
factor supplies in this two-step fashion. However, this thought experiment shows that the adjustment of a closed economy to an income-preserving change in endowment can be thought of as a two-step process: at unchanged prices output slides southeast along the original budget line, then prices change to put consumption on the new PPF. The usefulness of this way of thinking will become apparent in a moment.

6. As if: the factor content of trade

Let us now return to the situation described in Section 4, where a stylized OECD engages in trade with newly industrializing countries. At this point we note that if we ignore the “original” production possibility curve TT in Fig. 7 and the NIE offer curve in Fig. 6, the two diagrams are in fact identical.

---

*This analysis is essentially the same as that in Deardorff and Staiger (1988). However, their paper has been widely misunderstood, by me as well as others, so a restatement seems in order.*
This suggests that we can think of answering the “but-for” question about trade and factor prices in a somewhat different way.

We start with an economy producing at Q and consuming at C. We then imagine subtracting skilled labor from and adding unskilled labor to this economy in such a way as to leave its income at initial prices unchanged. If the hypothetical change in factor endowments is equal to the factor content of the real economy’s trade, we will end up with an economy whose production possibility curve is TT, that is an economy whose autarky prices are the same as the prices at which the original economy trades. Let us call this the “as-if” economy, short for “Autarky with the Same Income and Factor prices”.

The punchline should now be obvious. The “but-for” change in goods and factor prices of Section 4, the difference between actual prices and those that would prevail but for the possibility of trade, is exactly the same as the change in prices that would occur if the factor content of actual trade were added back to the autarkic “as-if” economy. (Users of the factor content approach usually think of the thought experiment as being one of subtracting factors from the real economy rather than adding them back to a hypothetical autarkic economy. This alternative way of stating things may seem roundabout. However, by making it clear that the hypothetical economy is autarkic we also make it clear that goods prices are endogenous in the exercise.)

In particular, we can now clarify the appropriate use for an often-maligned procedure. In a two-factor model, the log difference in relative factor prices due to trade may be estimated as the log difference in the ratio of factor supplies in the actual and “as if” economies, divided by the aggregate elasticity of substitution between these factors in the “as if” economy.

Is this reinterpretation — for that is all that it is — helpful? Why not simply stay with the approach in Section 4? We can offer two answers.

First, even a two-by-two CGE model requires specifying three elasticities of substitution, one for each industry and one for consumption. This may make it seem as if estimating the effect of trade on factor prices depends in some complex way on these parameters, so that it would be hard to do any systematic sensitivity analysis. The factor content approach makes it clear, however, that all of these elasticities matter only insofar as they affect the aggregate elasticity of substitution between factors, and thus that sensitivity analysis can be undertaken simply by considering the plausible range of values for that aggregate elasticity.

Second, because the but-for experiment turns out to be equivalent to a change in the factor endowment of a hypothetical economy, it is meaningful to compare the scale of recent trade-induced changes in “effective” factor supplies with actual changes in real factor supplies. What we find is that because the volume of North–South trade is small, the implicit exports of skilled and imports of unskilled labor by OECD countries are swamped by the increase in the actual skilled-to-unskilled ratio. This at least suggests that it is unlikely that trade has played a dominant role.
7. Not so fast? Objections

Judging from the recent denunciation of factor content calculations by Leamer (1998, 2000), there seem to be three main objections to their use.

First is the observation that trade volumes are endogenous. Yes, and so are trade prices. Neither endogeneity poses an obstacle to the but-for calculation.

Second, Leamer and others assert that the factor content approach is only valid if all production functions and tastes are Cobb–Douglas. As often stated, this objection seems to be based on a misunderstanding of what Deardorff and Staiger (1988) were saying. Certainly in a two-factor model the Cobb–Douglas assumption plays no role; and the case for using a two-factor model in this analysis is no worse than it is in any other context. Even in a multi-factor model, the basic proposition of factor content analysis remains completely valid. That is, the “but-for” consequences of a given level of trade are the same as those of adding the factor content of that trade to the “as-if” economy defined above.

What is true is that in a non-Cobb–Douglas world one cannot safely assume that the relative price of any two factors depends only on the ratio of their two endowments; in general, it will depend on other factor supplies as well. This is really a point about the limits of “twoness” in trade modelling, not about factor content per se. And surely it remains true that if you change factor endowments, and the vector of changes is small (by whatever metric) relative to the initial vector, you would not expect large changes in factor prices, Cobb–Douglas or not. It therefore follows that if the volume of net trade in factor services is small, so must be the effects on factor prices.

Finally, the objection has been raised that the factor content approach is invalid in the face of trade imbalances. The same might be said of all CGE trade exercises: because the underlying model does not allow for trade imbalances, it is necessary either to introduce them by some ad hoc procedure or to represent the world by an approximate version in which trade is balanced. For most current purposes the latter approach seems adequate.

In the end, of course, one must return to the data. If one accepts that the factor content approach makes sense, one can then proceed to the problem of getting better estimates of the relevant numbers. These include factor contents themselves and, even more crucially, the aggregate elasticity of substitution.

8. Conclusions

The assessment of the causes of changes in factor prices is ultimately an empirical matter, and thus the conclusion of recent empirical work that trade has been only a secondary influence while technology has been the main cause is subject to revision if new data or improved estimates come along. What we can say is that the conceptual foundations of this work are sound.
That is, it may turn out that the *prima facie* case that skill-biased technological change has played an important role in the rising skill premium is wrong; but researchers have been right to emphasize the potential importance of that bias. It may turn out that, despite what now seems to be the case, it is possible to construct a quantitatively plausible model that reconciles large distributional effects from international trade with the small volume of that trade; but researchers have been right to see small trade volume as a problem for those who would make trade the main culprit behind falling wages. It may turn out that for one reason or another calculations that show small net factor content of trade are misleading; but such calculations are a valid and useful approach to the problem.

Moreover, we may argue that the way that we can ground such empirical assessments in general-equilibrium trade models is a vindication of such models as practical tools. Indeed, the whole issue of trade, technology, and wages may be regarded as having provided a unique opportunity for trade economists to demonstrate the power and usefulness of their theoretical framework.

Why, then, has the subject instead become a matter of intense, sometimes bitter dispute? Not because of arguments about the appropriate model: all players in the controversy agree that the relationships among trade, technology, and factor prices are indeed very well suited for analysis using the standard competitive trade model. The dispute is, instead, essentially philosophical: it hinges on the question of what thought experiments to perform, and in particular about the role of the standard exercises that are used to explain trade theory in the classroom. It seems to me, at least, that there has been a tendency to confuse pedagogy with relevance. What one does when one examines the effect of an exogenous change in world prices, or a unilateral change in technology in a small open economy, is to perform a thought experiment, a thought experiment whose details have been chosen to lay bare the mechanics of the model, not necessarily to make sense of a real-world issue. We should not, however, identify the canonical thought experiments with the model itself. Classroom exercises that explore the effects of technical change in a small price-taking economy do not address the issues posed by technical change occurring in the OECD as a whole; the absence of trade volumes in the statement of the Stolper–Samuelson theorem, which implicitly involves a thought experiment in which prices are changed exogenously, does not mean that such volumes are irrelevant to attempts to infer the impact of trade on factor prices when the impact of trade on goods prices is part of the question. And trade theorists, myself included, were quick to dismiss factor content calculations as misleading, without making any serious effort to see what they might tell us; did we assume they must be wrong simply because calculating the relationship between factor content and changes in factor prices is not a standard classroom exercise?

There is nothing wrong with addressing policy issues using general equilibrium trade theory. Indeed, that theory has never been more relevant than it is today. But no model will give us the right answers if we are not careful to ask the right questions.
References