I am an Associate Professor of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics in the Department of Economics at Iowa State University. My research uses economic theory and econometric methods to understand and improve the management of natural resource-based industries. Much of my work examines the impacts of market-based approaches for managing ocean commercial fisheries. Recent research projects focus on multiple-species fisheries, decision making under uncertainty, bycatch, and rent dissipation under rights-based management programs.

VITAE

Recent Papers

Fleet restructuring, rent generation and the design of individual transferable fishing quota programs: Empirical evidence from the pacific coast groundfish fishery. Marine Resource Economics, 24 (2010): 329-359, with Carl Lian and Rajesh Singh (recipient of the Dr. S.-Y. Hong Award for Outstanding Article in Marine Resource Economics) download pdf

Bio-Economies of scope and the discard problem in multiple-species fisheries, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 58 (2009): 72-92, with Rajesh Singh download pdf

Benefits of management reform in the Gulf of Mexico grouper fishery: A semi-parametric analysis, Resource and Environmental Economics, forthcoming download pdf

Search and active learning with correlated information: evidence from Mid-Atlantic clam fishermen, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 32 (2008): 1921-1848, with Philippe Marcoul download pdf

Fisheries management with stock growth uncertainty and costly capital adjustment, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 52 (2006): 582-599, with Rajesh Singh and Matthew Doyle download pdf

Meetings with costly participation: an empirical analysis, Review of Economic Studies, 72, Number 1 (January 2005): 247-268, with Matthew Turner download pdf

Economic benefits of management reform in the northern Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 46, Issue 2, (September 2003): 207-230, with James A. Waters download pdf

Working Papers

Trading frictions and fishery discards download pdf

This paper studies harvest uncertainty in a fishery that is managed with tradable quotas. We show that eliminating trading frictions in quota markets can eliminate at-sea discards that occur due to random catch-quota imbalance. In general, discards and the cost of harvesting a fixed quota increases with trading costs. As an alternative, when trading costs are unavoidable, we deduce an ad-valorem tax/subsidy that can eliminate discards while delivering a desired harvest target. These results have important implications for quota program designs, which often limit quota trades to address ancillary management objectives.

Markov-Perfect rent dissipation in rights-based fisheries download pdf
 
This paper present a general, dynamic model of within-season harvesting competition in a fishery managed with individual transferable quotas. Markov-Perfect equilibrium harvesting and quota purchase strategies are derived using numerical collocation methods. The numerical approach allows direct examination of harvest patterns and rent loss due to unattended production externalities. The stock conditions, harvest technologies and demand conditions under which standard rights-based schemes do not replicate first best outcomes are identified. The results provide new insights for designing rights-based programs that are capable of maximizing economic rent in marine fisheries.

Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries download pdf

This paper studies equilibrium search and learning in a dynamic fishing game that is played by independent fishermen and by members of an information sharing cooperative. Once collected, information about the location of productive fishing sites is an excludable public good. We show that independent fishermen do not internalize the full value of information and do not replicate first-best search patterns. An information sharing cooperative faces a free-riding problem as each member prefers that another undertake costly search for information. Contracts can be written to improve upon free-riding, however they may create ineffcient search relative to the first-best. The results explain why information sharing cooperatives are rare in fisheries and provide insights for the regulation of fisheries.

Random harvests, discards and catch-quota balancing mechanisms in rights-based fisheries

It is oftern argued that individual transferable quota (ITQ) management programs are not well-suited for multi-species fisheries. An often cited but unverified problem is that randomness in harvest creates mismatches between catch and quota holdings. To comply with regulations, fishermen may choose to discard overages at sea, creating additional management problems. The discard problem can be magnified if fishermen must balance catches and quotas across multiple species. In response to this concern, ITQ program designs often include some form of quota-balancing scheme, designed to counter the discard incentive when catch-quota mismatch occurs.

We introduce a model of a stochastic, multiple-species harvest technology to study discard incentives under various quota-balancing schemes currently used in ITQ fisheries. We show that most schemes, all but a provision that allows frictionless post harvest quota trades, can create unintended effects.  Relative to a standard ITQ design, some quota balancing schemes likely increase at-sea discarding. The reason is that quota balancing schemes introduce post-harvest management flexibility for fishermen, which tends to raise the ex post value of the stochastic catch. Fishermen optimally respond by increasing the ex ante allocation of factor inputs. Increasing inputs lowers the costs associated with a catch realization below the quota, i.e., a catch underage. The response also increases the likelihood of overages and discards. A second unintended effect of added management flexibility is loss of management control over harvest and discards in the fishery. With added flexibility, fishermen adjust the expected mix of harvested species to maximize profits. We show under popular quota balancing mechanisms, harvests and discards depend in complex ways on the array of prices, quota issued by managers, and operating rules. Our analysis characterizes the performance of various quota balancing schemes. We then derive the properties of a first best ITQ design for a multiple-species fishery.

Halibut Project

SEARCH, LEARNING AND DYNAMIC CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ALASKAN HALIBUT FISHERMEN

This goal of the 'Halibut' project is to provide new empirical knowledge about how people form expectations about uncertain events that affect their lives, and how people process and learn from new information. During the 2006 and 2007 west coast commercial halibut fishing seasons our research team recorded individual fishermen beliefs about the catch and weather uncertainty they face, and choices made about where and when to fish. The data is being used to develop tests of competing theories of decision-making, learning and search under uncertainty. The results are expected to make important contributions to the fields of behavioral economics.

The followng document provides an overview of the study goals and the data that were collected download pdf. Additional results are expected in the fall of 2011.

Personal Information

I was born and raised in Kelowna, British Columbia which is located in the Okanagan Valley. My education and career has taken me through Alberta, Alaska, Maryland, Utah, Washington State, and Iowa. Elizabeth and I were married in 1995 and we have two great kids.
Below are a few pictures of Sam, Lucy, Beth and I.